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OPINION 
_______________ 
 
COWEN, Circuit Judge. 
  Defendants Douglas M. Weidner, Kathleen K. 
Weidner, and DMW Marine, LLC (“DMW”), appeal from the 
order of the United States District Court for the Eastern 
District of Pennsylvania granting Plaintiff Deborah D. Klein’s 
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motion for summary judgment as to her claim that Mr. 
Weidner’s transfer of a parcel of real estate to himself and 
Ms. Weidner as tenants by the entirety violated the 
Pennsylvania Uniform Fraudulent Transfer Act (“PUFTA”).  
They also appeal from the subsequent order entering 
judgment pursuant to the District Court’s decision on partial 
summary judgment, which specifically ordered the Weidners 
to execute a deed transferring this parcel of real estate to Mr. 
Weidner in fee simple.  In addition, Appellants challenge the 
District Court’s order directing that judgment of $548,797.07 
in punitive damages be entered against Mr. Weidner for his 
PUFTA violations.  We will affirm. 
 
I. 
 
 In 1999, Ms. Klein and Mr. Weidner obtained a 
divorce in California.  As part of this divorce decree, the 
Orange County Superior Court ordered Mr. Weidner to make 
spousal and child support payments to Ms. Klein.  Appellants 
acknowledge that “Weidner made some child support 
payments but had paid no spousal support as of the date of 
trial in this case.”  (Appellants’ Brief at 3 (citing Klein v. 
Weidner, Civil Action No. 08-3798, 2010 WL 2671450, at *1 
(E.D. Pa. Jul. 2, 2010) (“Klein III”)).)   Mr. Weidner and Ms. 
Weidner, his current wife, “were aware of Klein’s claim that 
Weidner owed her spousal and child support at the time they 
married” on January 1, 2006.  (Id. at 4 (citing Klein III, 2010 
WL 2671450, at *2).)  On June 2, 2008, the Orange County 
Superior Court determined that Mr. Weidner owed Ms. Klein 
$548,797.07 in unpaid spousal and child support.  A 
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judgment in this amount was entered in the Chester County 
Court of Common Pleas on August 25, 2008. 
 
 On March 17, 2005, Mr. Weidner purchased a parcel 
of real estate located in Chester Springs, Pennsylvania 
(“Property”), from his mother.  On January 17, 2006, he 
transferred the Property to himself and Ms. Weidner as 
tenants by the entirety. 
 
 Ms. Klein alleged in the first count of her amended 
complaint that Mr. Weidner’s transfer of the Property violated 
the PUFTA.  On January 6, 2010, the District Court granted 
her motion for summary judgment as to this claim because 
“Weidner’s transfer of the Property satisfies all three of the 
fraudulent transfers described by PUFTA.”  Klein v. Weidner, 
Civil Action No. 08-3798, 2010 WL 27910, at *1 (E.D. Pa. 
Jan. 6, 2010) (“Klein I”).  According to the District Court, the 
transfer constituted an actual fraudulent transfer under 12 Pa. 
Cons. Stat. Ann. § 5104(a)(1) and a constructive fraudulent 
transfer under 12 Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann. §§ 5104(a)(2) and 
5105.  On January 13, 2010, the District Court entered an 
order for entry of judgment pursuant to the District Court’s 
partial summary judgment decision, and the Weidners were 
ordered to execute a deed transferring the Property back to 
Mr. Weidner in fee simple by 10 a.m., January 15, 2010. 
 
 Ms. Klein also attacked Mr. Weidner’s transfer of an 
ownership interest in DMW and attempted to pierce DMW’s 
corporate veil.  The District Court denied Ms. Klein’s motion 
for summary judgment as to these counts in Klein I.  
Following a bench trial, it entered its findings of fact and 
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conclusions of law on February 18, 2010.  According to the 
District Court, the transfer of the ownership interest in DMW 
to the Weidners as joint owners—just like the transfer of the 
Property to the couple as tenants by the entirety—constituted 
both an actual and a constructive fraudulent transfer under 
Sections 5104(a)(1), 5104(a)(2), and 5105 of the PUFTA.  
The District Court also determined that “Weidner has 
improperly used the LLC form to perpetrate an injustice and 
therefore Klein may reverse-pierce the corporate veil and 
treat DMW’s assets as Weidner’s assets for the purpose of 
collecting her judgment against Weidner.”  Klein v. Weidner, 
Civil Action No. 08-3798, 2010 WL 571800, at *10 (E.D. Pa. 
Feb. 17, 2010) (“Klein II”).  Judgment was entered against 
Mr. Weidner, Ms. Weidner, and DMW on the second and 
third counts, and the parties were directed to brief the issue of 
whether punitive damages should be awarded and, if so, in 
what amount. 
 
 In a memorandum entered on July 6, 2010, the District 
Court concluded that “[p]unitive damages may be awarded 
for violations of PUFTA.”  Klein III, 2010 WL 2671450, at 
*10.  Determining that Mr. Weidner—but not Ms. Weidner—
engaged in conduct in connection with his fraudulent 
transfers that was so outrageous as to warrant an award of 
punitive damages, the District Court ordered that “judgment 
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of $548,797.07 in punitive damages is entered” against Mr. 
Weidner.
1
  Id. 
 
II. 
 
 The District Court had jurisdiction over this diversity 
matter pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1332.
2
   
 
 It is undisputed that the substantive law of 
Pennsylvania applies here.  After all, Ms. Klein alleged 
violations of the PUFTA, i.e., Pennsylvania’s specific version 
of the Uniform Fraudulent Transfer Act (“UFTA”).  In the 
                                                 
1
 On April 19, 2011, Mr. Weidner notified the Clerk 
that, on December 23, 2010, he filed a voluntary petition for 
bankruptcy under Chapter 11 in the United States Bankruptcy 
Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania.  On May 3, 
2011, the Clerk stayed the current appeal pursuant to 11 
U.S.C. § 362 and directed Mr. Weidner to file status reports 
every 90 days until either the automatic stay is lifted or the 
bankruptcy is discharged.  In his October 10, 2012 status 
report, Mr. Weidner indicated that the Bankruptcy Court 
denied discharge on September 10, 2012 in an adversary 
proceeding (which was commenced by Ms. Klein).  An 
appeal was filed from this Bankruptcy Court ruling to the 
District Court.  Appellants also requested that the current 
Third Circuit appeal be removed from suspense.  In an 
October 18, 2012 order, the Clerk construed the status report 
as a motion to lift the stay and granted the motion.      
2
 Ms. Klein is a citizen of California, while the 
Weidners and DMW are Pennsylvania citizens.   
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absence of a Pennsylvania Supreme Court ruling on the 
precise question of law presented, we must predict how it 
would resolve the question.  See, e.g., Orson, Inc. v. Miramax 
Film Corp., 79 F.3d 1358, 1373 n.15 (3d Cir. 1996).  In 
addressing the statutory predecessor to the PUFTA (i.e., 
Pennsylvania’s version of the Uniform Fraudulent 
Conveyance Act (“UCFA”), the Pennsylvania Uniform 
Fraudulent Conveyance Act (“PUFCA”)), we explained that, 
“[w]here Pennsylvania law is silent, we may look to the law 
in other jurisdictions that have adopted the UFCA, and 
decisions construing analogous provisions of the Bankruptcy 
Code.”  Moody v. Security Pac. Bus. Credit, Inc., 971 F.2d 
1056, 1063 (3d Cir. 1992) (citations omitted). 
 
We exercise plenary review over a district court’s 
grant of summary judgment, applying the same standard that 
the district court should have applied.  See, e.g., Farrell v. 
Planters Lifesavers Co., 206 F.3d 271, 278 (3d Cir. 2000).  As 
the District Court noted, “[s]ummary judgment may be 
granted only ‘if the pleadings, depositions, answers to 
interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the 
affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any 
material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment 
as a matter of law.’”  Klein I, 2010 WL 27910, at *1 (quoting 
Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c) (2009)). 
 
III. 
 
A. The Property Transfer Claim 
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Appellants argue that the District Court committed 
reversible error by granting summary judgment on Ms. 
Klein’s claim that the transfer of the Property violated the 
PUFTA.  We nevertheless agree with the District Court that 
this action constituted an actual fraudulent transfer as well as 
a constructive fraudulent transfer. 
 
The District Court began with the actual fraudulent 
transfer category.  Section 5104(a)(1) states that “[a] transfer 
made or obligation incurred by a debtor is fraudulent as to a 
creditor, whether the creditor’s claim arose before or after the 
transfer was made or the obligation was incurred, if the debtor 
made the transfer or incurred the obligation . . . with actual 
intent to hinder, delay or defraud any creditor of the debtor.”  
Section 5104(b) then lists a number of factors—the “badges 
of fraud”—that may be considered in determining “whether 
the debtor had an actual intent to hinder, delay or defraud one 
or more creditors.”  12 Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann. § 5104 cmt. 5.  
These Section 5104(b) factors include: 
 
(1) the transfer or obligation was to an insider; 
 
(2) the debtor retained possession or control of 
the property transferred after the transfer; 
 
(3) the transfer or obligation was disclosed or 
concealed; 
 
(4) before the transfer was made or obligation 
was incurred, the debtor had been sued or 
threatened with suit; 
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(5) the transfer was of substantially all the 
debtor’s assets; 
 
(6) the debtor absconded; 
 
(7) the debtor removed or concealed assets; 
 
(8) the value of the consideration received by 
the debtor was reasonably equivalent to the 
value of the asset transferred or the amount of 
the obligation incurred; 
 
(9) the debtor was insolvent or became 
insolvent shortly after the transfer was made or 
the obligation was incurred; 
 
(10) the transfer occurred shortly before or 
shortly after a substantial debt was incurred; 
and 
 
(11) the debtor transferred the essential assets of 
the business to a lienor who transferred the 
assets to an insider of the debtor. 
 
“Proof of the existence of any one or more of the factors 
enumerated in subsection (b) may be relevant evidence as to 
the debtor’s actual intent but does not create a presumption 
that the debtor has made a fraudulent transfer or incurred a 
fraudulent obligation.”  12 Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann. § 5104 cmt. 
5.  The court should take into account all of the relevant 
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circumstances in applying these statutory factors.  See, e.g., 
12 Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann. § 5104 cmt. 6. 
 
 Although Appellants argue at some length that there 
were genuine issues of material fact as to several Section 
5104(b) factors, we conclude that the District Court did not 
commit any reversible error given the undisputed evidence in 
the record. 
 
Initially, it is undisputed that “the transfer . . . was to 
an insider” under Section 5104(b)(1)—namely, Mr. 
Weidner’s own spouse—and that Mr. Weidner “retained 
possession or control of the property transferred after the 
transfer” pursuant to Section 5104(b)(2).  With respect to 
Section 5104(b)(4), both Mr. Weidner as well as Ms. Weidner 
knew at the time of their marriage that Ms. Klein claimed that 
Mr. Weidner owed both spousal and child support.  
Appellants also acknowledge that “there had been an ongoing 
dispute since 2002 regarding the amount of support 
arrearages Weidner owed Klein” (Appellants’ Brief at 19 
(citing Klein I, 2010 WL 27910, at *1)) and that “Weidner 
made some child support payments but had paid no spousal 
support as of the date of trial in this case” (id. at 3 (citing 
Klein III, 2010 WL 2671450, at *1)).  With respect to 
whether “the transfer was of substantially all the debtor’s 
assets” under Section 5104(b)(5), Appellants contend that the 
Property did not constitute an asset because it was subject to a 
mortgage at the time of its transfer and the statutory definition 
of “Asset” excludes “property to the extent it is encumbered 
by a valid lien,” 12 Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann. § 5101(b).  Even 
with the mortgage (which Mr. Klein granted to his mother as 
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part of his purchase of the Property from her), it appears 
undisputed that there was still $525,000 of equity in the 
Property itself.  While Appellants contend that, among other 
things, Ms. Weidner paid over $300,000 for improvements to 
the Property, “‘reasonably equivalent value’ is measured from 
Klein’s perspective, not the Weidners’.’”  Klein I, 2010 WL 
27910, at *2 (citing In re Walter, 261 B.R. 139, 143 (Bankr. 
Ct. W.D. Pa. 2001); In re Erie Marine Enters., Inc., 213 B.R. 
799, 803 (Bankr. Ct. W.D. Pa. 1997)).  The transfer to the 
Weidners as tenants by the entirety removed the Property 
from Ms. Klein’s reach, and Ms. Weidner’s payments (and 
any promises she made to pay for renovations) therefore 
could not constitute reasonably equivalent value under 
Section 5104(b)(8).  See, e.g., United States v. Parcel of Real 
Property Known as 1500 Lincoln Ave., 949 F.2d 73, 77-78 
(3d Cir. 1991) (noting that tenant by entirety is protected 
against levy upon property by co-tenant’s creditor).  Mr. 
Weidner also indicated in his own deposition testimony that 
he held no assets in only his name after he transferred the 
Property and the DMW interest to himself and Ms. Weidner.  
Mr. Weidner accordingly “was insolvent or became insolvent 
shortly after the transfer was made” pursuant to Section 
5104(b)(9). 
 
 Ultimately, the first, second, fourth, fifth, eighth, and 
ninth statutory factors indicated that the transfer at issue here 
was actually fraudulent.  In addition to the statutory “badges 
of fraud,” the District Court also looked to Mr. Weidner’s 
own “words and conduct” as evidence of his intent.  Klein I, 
2010 WL 27910, at *3.  For example, Mr. Weidner stated in a 
2001 e-mail to Ms. Klein that “he would ‘never ever give her 
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a red cent again’ and Klein would ‘never ever see a penny 
from [him] again.’”  Id. at *3 (citing 11/27/01 E-mail).  Mr. 
Weidner’s California attorney likewise notified his 
counterpart that “‘I have been informed by Mr. Weidner that 
his assets that do exist have been protected in such a way that 
while the children will be provided for, it will be impossible 
for [Klein] to recover any of the court ordered arrearages.’”  
Id. (citing 2/1/05 Letter).  Given these undisputed 
circumstances, the District Court properly concluded that Mr. 
Weidner transferred the Property with an actual intent to 
hinder, delay, or defraud. 
 
 Under Section 5104(a)(2), a transfer (or obligation) is 
constructively fraudulent as to present and future creditors if 
the debtor made the transfer (or incurred the obligation): 
 
(2) without receiving a reasonably equivalent 
value in exchange for the transfer or obligation, 
and the debtor: 
 
(i) was engaged or was about to engage in a 
business or transaction for which the 
remaining assets of the debtor were 
unreasonably small in relation to the 
business or transaction; or  
 
(ii) intended to incur, or believed or 
reasonably should have believed that the 
debtor would incur, debts beyond the 
debtor’s ability to pay as they became due. 
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Section 5105 states the following: 
 
A transfer made or obligation incurred by a 
debtor is fraudulent as to a creditor whose claim 
arose before the transfer was made or the 
obligation was incurred if the debtor made the 
transfer or incurred the obligation without 
receiving a reasonably equivalent value in 
exchange for the transfer or obligation and the 
debtor was insolvent at that time or the debtor 
became insolvent as a result of the transfer or 
obligation. 
 
In applying these constructive fraudulent transfer 
provisions, the District Court relied on the same basic line of 
reasoning it applied in concluding that the transfer was 
actually fraudulent pursuant to Section 5104(a)(1).  Given our 
discussion of the actual fraudulent transfer category, we agree 
that Mr. Weidner transferred the Property without receiving a 
reasonably equivalent value in exchange, his transfer of the 
Property and the DMW interest rendered him insolvent, he 
either believed or should have believed that he would incur 
debts beyond his ability to pay, and Ms. Klein herself was a 
present creditor at the time of the transfer. 
 
Appellants take issue with the District Court’s failure 
to consider Ms. Weidner as an alleged good faith transferee 
under 12 Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann. § 5108(a).  This subsection 
states that “[a] transfer or obligation is not fraudulent under 
section 5104(a)(1) (relating to transfers fraudulent as to 
present and future creditors) against a person who took in 
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good faith and for a reasonably equivalent value or against 
any subsequent transferee or obligee.”  We have already 
explained that Ms. Weidner did not provide reasonably 
equivalent value, and we accordingly reject Appellants’ 
invocation of this defense.
3
 
 
B. Availability of Punitive Damages under the PUFTA 
 
 It appears undisputed that neither this Court—nor any 
Pennsylvania appellate court—has addressed the specific 
question of whether or not punitive damages are available 
under the PUFTA or the PUFCA.  We predict that the 
Pennsylvania Supreme Court would answer this question in 
the affirmative. 
 
 Following the example set by Appellants themselves, 
we turn to the general rules of statutory construction set forth 
in Pennsylvania’s Statutory Construction Act of 1972.  “The 
                                                 
3
 Appellants also claim that Ms. Klein’s appellate brief 
violates Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 28 as well as 
Third Circuit Local Appellate Rules 28.1, 28.2, and 28.3 by 
failing to include citations to the appendix or the record and 
by engaging in unsubstantiated personal attacks.  In the end, 
we do not believe that her brief violates any procedural rule.  
However, we take this opportunity to reiterate the vital 
importance of including appropriate and complete citations to 
the appendix or record in briefing submitted to this Court as 
well as our expectation that attorneys admitted to the Third 
Circuit bar will exhibit professionalism and courtesy at all 
times.       
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object of all interpretation and construction of statutes is to 
ascertain and effectuate the intention of the General 
Assembly.”  1 Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann. § 1921(a).  Accordingly, 
“[e]very statute shall be construed, if possible, to give effect 
to all its provisions.”  Id.  Conversely, “[w]hen the words of a 
statute are clear and free from all ambiguity, the letter of it is 
not to be disregarded under the pretext of pursuing its spirit.”  
1 Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann. § 1921(b).  “When the words of the 
statute are not explicit, the intention of the General Assembly 
may be ascertained by considering,” inter alia, the occasion 
and necessity for the statute, the circumstances under which it 
was enacted, the mischief to be remedied, the object to be 
attained, the former law, and the consequences of a particular 
interpretation.   1 Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann. § 1921(c)(1)-(6).  In 
short, the court should consider the nature and purpose of the 
statute.  Appellants specifically emphasize 1 Pa. Cons. Stat. 
Ann. § 1504, entitled “Statutory remedy preferred over 
common law.”  This general rule of statutory construction 
states that: 
 
In all cases where a remedy is provided or a 
duty is enjoined or anything is directed to be 
done by any statute, the directions of the statute 
shall be strictly pursued, and no penalty shall be 
inflicted, or anything done agreeably to the 
common law, in such cases, further than shall 
be necessary for carrying such statute in effect. 
 
The Pennsylvania Statutory Construction Act further provides 
that “[s]tatutes uniform with those of other states shall be 
interpreted and construed to effect their general purpose to 
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make uniform the laws of those states which enact them.”  1 
Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann. § 1927. 
 
  12 Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann. § 5107 governs the “Remedies 
of creditors” under the PUFTA: 
 
(a) Available remedies.—In an action for relief 
against a transfer or obligation under this 
chapter, a creditor, subject to the limitations in 
sections 5108 (relating to defenses, liability and 
protection of transferee) and 5109 (relating to 
extinguishment of cause of action), may obtain: 
 
(1) Avoidance of the transfer or 
obligation to the extent necessary to 
satisfy the creditor’s claim. 
 
(2) An attachment or other provisional 
remedy against the asset transferred or 
other property of the transferee in 
accordance with the procedure 
prescribed by applicable law. 
 
(3) Subject to applicable principles of 
equity and in accordance with applicable 
rules of civil procedure: 
 
(i) an injunction against further 
disposition by the debtor or a 
transferee, or both, of the asset 
transferred or of other property; 
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(ii) appointment of a receiver to take 
charge of the asset transferred or of 
other property of the transferee; or 
 
(iii) any other relief the circumstances 
may require. 
 
(b) Execution.—If a creditor has obtained a 
judgment on a claim against the debtor, the 
creditor, if the court so orders, subject to the 
limitations of sections 5108 and 5109, may levy 
execution on the asset transferred or its 
proceeds. 
 
In turn, 12 Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann. § 5108 (“Defenses, liability 
and protection of transferee”) includes the following 
subsection: 
 
(b) Judgment for certain voidable transfers.—
Except as otherwise provided in this section, to 
the extent a transfer is voidable in an action by a 
creditor under section 5107(a)(1) (relating to 
remedies of creditors), the creditor may recover 
judgment for the value of the asset transferred, 
as adjusted under subsection (c), or the amount 
necessary to satisfy the creditor’s claim, 
whichever is less.  The judgment may be 
entered against: 
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(1) the first transferee of the asset or the 
person for whose benefit the transfer was 
made; or 
 
(2) any subsequent transferee other than 
a good faith transferee who took for 
value or from any subsequent transferee. 
 
“If the judgment under subsection (b) is based upon the value 
of the asset transferred, the judgment must be for an amount 
equal to the value of the asset at the time of the transfer, 
subject to adjustment as the equities may require.”  12 Pa. 
Cons. Stat. Ann. § 5108(c).  The PUFTA also includes a 
“Supplementary provisions” section.  Pursuant to 12 Pa. 
Cons. Stat. Ann. § 5110, “[u]nless displaced by the provisions 
of this chapter, the principles of law and equity, including the 
law merchant and the law relating to principal and agent, 
estoppel, laches, fraud, misrepresentation, duress, coercion, 
mistake, insolvency or other validating or invalidating cause, 
supplement its provisions.” 
 
In addition to the Pennsylvania Statutory Construction 
Act, Appellants turn for support to the statutory language, 
nature, and purposes of the PUFTA as well as case law 
addressing the PUFTA, the PUFCA, and other allegedly 
similar Pennsylvania statutory schemes.  They additionally 
“look to the law in other jurisdictions that have adopted the 
UFCA [and the UFTA].”  Moody, 971 F.2d at 1063 (citation 
omitted).  With respect to Pennsylvania case law, Appellants 
place particular emphasis on the Pennsylvania Supreme 
Court’s 1930 decision in Schline v. Kline, 152 A. 845 (Pa. 
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1930), which discussed the PUFCA, and its more recent 
ruling in Hoy v. Angelone, 720 A.2d 745 (Pa. 1998), which 
held that punitive damages are not available under the 
Pennsylvania Human Relations Act (“PHRA”).  According to 
Appellants, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court, in cases like 
Hoy, has decided that punitive damages are unavailable in 
statutory actions unless the statute expressly provides for such 
damages.  With respect to the PUFTA itself, Appellants 
emphasize the remedial nature and purposes of this fraudulent 
transfer statute.  They believe that “the remedies are all 
focused upon preservation of assets and making the creditor 
whole—and no more.”  (Appellants’ Brief at 8.)  The PUFTA 
accordingly does not expressly state that punitive damages 
may be awarded.  Appellants, in turn, claim that Section 
5107(a)(1) provides that transfers and obligations may be 
avoided only to the extent necessary to satisfy the creditor’s 
claim and that Section 5108(b) limits the monetary damages 
that a creditor may recover.  According to Appellants, 
“punitive damages were not required to afford Klein the 
remedies of PUFTA,” “[t]he common law principles of 
punitive damages conflict with and far exceed the remedies 
available under PUFTA because such remedies are designed 
to compensate plaintiffs to the extent of the value of the 
transferred property, while at the same time, protecting (not 
punishing) transferees,” and “an award of punitive damages 
under PUFTA is inappropriate because it exceeds that which 
is necessary to obtain the protections of the statute.”  (Id. at 
15-16 (citations omitted).) 
 
Having considered the various contentions raised by 
the parties as well as the District Court’s own reasoning, we 
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predict that the Pennsylvania Supreme Court would conclude 
that punitive damages are available under the PUFTA.  We 
make this prediction based on the actual language of the 
statute itself—especially the “catch-all” provision in Section 
5107(a)(3)(iii).  We also rely on the nature and purposes of 
this uniform statutory scheme as well as prior case law from 
Pennsylvania and other jurisdictions. 
 
As an initial matter, we do not believe that Schline has 
much, if any, bearing on the present inquiry.  Appellants turn 
to a single sentence from this opinion:  “As this act does not 
specify a particular course of procedure, that previously 
existing and any necessary modification thereof may be 
adopted, in order to enable the one attacking the ‘conveyance’ 
to obtain the rights accorded by the statute.”  Schline, 152 A. 
at 846.  The state supreme court actually disposed of the 
appeal in that case on different grounds, before briefly calling 
attention to the PUFCA because “the case goes back for a 
trial.”  Id.   More importantly, it did not actually identify the 
“rights accorded by the statute” and therefore did not consider 
whether such “rights” could include punitive damages.  If 
anything, the Schline court seemed to be more concerned 
with the proper procedure to use (i.e., “that previously 
existing and any necessary modification thereof”) than the 
actual forms of relief available under the PUFCA itself. 
 
 In Hoy, the state supreme court did consider the 
availability of punitive damages under Pennsylvania’s anti-
discrimination statute.  In a rather lengthy opinion, the Hoy 
court specifically addressed the following statutory provision: 
 21 
“If the court finds that the respondent has 
engaged in or is engaging in an unlawful 
discriminatory practice charged in the 
complaint, the court shall enjoin the respondent 
from engaging in such unlawful discriminatory 
practice and order affirmative action which may 
include, but is not limited to, reinstatement or 
hiring of employes, granting of back pay, or any 
other legal or equitable relief as the court deems 
appropriate.  Back pay liability shall not accrue 
from a date more than three years prior to the 
filing of a complaint charging violations of this 
act.” 
 
Hoy, 720 A.2d at 748 (quoting 43 Pa. Stat. Ann. § 962(c)(3)).  
The Pennsylvania Supreme Court held that, “[i]n the absence 
of express statutory language or any further legislative 
guidance,” punitive damages are not available under the 
PHRA.  Id. at 751. 
 
The court began by noting that the Pennsylvania 
General Assembly was free to provide for punitive damages 
under the PHRA and that a cursory survey of other statutory 
enactments revealed that it knew how to do so in clear and 
unambiguous terms.  Id. at 748 & n.3.  “Thus, as a starting 
point, it is reasonable to infer that the General Assembly’s use 
of specific language to permit the award of punitive damages 
in numerous statutes reflects an intention to allow such a 
remedy only when expressly provided for.”  Id. at 748.  
Asking the court to read this remedy into the statute, the 
plaintiff focused on the “any other legal or equitable relief” 
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language as well as the statute’s liberal construction 
requirement.  Id.  Pursuant to the canon of ejusdem generis 
(“‘[g]eneral words shall be construed to take their meanings 
and be restricted by preceding particular words,’” id. (quoting 
1 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 1903(b)), the state supreme court turned to 
the introductory phrase “affirmative action” as well as the 
specific examples provided thereafter.  Id. at 748-49.  
“Indeed, to focus solely on the phrase ‘any other legal and 
equitable relief’ and contend that any and all remedies are 
available under the Act would be to relegate the introductory 
phrase ‘affirmative action’ to mere surplusage, an approach 
which we are not at liberty to take.”  Id. at 749 n.4 (citing 1 
Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann. § 1922(2)).  “Thus, the seemingly 
limitless phrase ‘any other legal or equitable relief’ must be 
construed in this light.”  Id. at 749.  The Hoy court concluded 
that “the phrase ‘any other legal or equitable relief’ is clearly 
a subset of the ‘affirmative action’ which a court may order,” 
and it therefore considered “whether punitive damages are 
properly awarded as affirmative action for purposes of the 
Act.”  Id.  According to the state supreme court, the PHRA 
constitutes a remedial statute whose purpose is to protect the 
rights of individuals to obtain and hold a job without 
discrimination and to foster the employment of all individuals 
in accordance with their abilities, regardless of their sex or 
similar characteristics.  Id.  The statutory provision thereby 
offers various examples of “make-whole measures” (e.g., 
reinstatement, hiring, and back pay).  Id.  Accordingly, 
“affirmative action contemplates make whole measures and 
remedial action.”  Id.  On the other hand, punitive damages, 
which are based on the defendant’s culpability and are purely 
penal in nature, “are not consistent with this goal of achieving 
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the remedial purposes of the statute and are not a make-whole 
remedy.”  Id.  “While punitive damages also serve to deter, 
simply put, we do not consider punitive damages to be 
consistent with the remedial nature of the Act.”  Id.   Instead, 
the Pennsylvania Supreme Court believed that, “when 
interpreted in the context of contemplated affirmative action, 
the phrase ‘any other legal or equitable relief’ does not 
include punitive damages.”  Id. 
 
 The Hoy court reached the following conclusion:  “In 
sum, we are of the view that the Legislature’s silence on the 
issue of punitive damages, together with the statutory 
language, interpreted consistent with the laws of statutory 
construction and in the context of the nature and purpose of 
the Act, requires the conclusion that the Legislature did not 
intend to permit the award of exemplary damages.”  Id.  
Although not necessary to its disposition, it also addressed the 
other arguments advanced by the parties, including the 
plaintiff’s theory that “public policy requires the remedy of 
exemplary damages.”  Id. at 751.  The court did not dispute 
the premise that punitive damages would deter 
discrimination.  Id.  Nevertheless, it believed that such a 
premise is insufficient to support an inference that the 
General Assembly intended an award of punitive damages 
given the extraordinary nature of such relief.  Id.  According 
to the Pennsylvania Supreme Court, “punitive damages are 
not absolutely necessary to achieve the Act’s goals of 
eliminating discrimination and redressing injury” because the 
courts already possess broad authority under the statutory 
scheme to fashion remedies that discourage discrimination 
and restore the injured party (i.e., the PHRA expressly 
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permits injunctive relief, reinstatement, hiring, and an award 
of back pay).  Id.  “While it can be persuasively argued that 
punitive damages are entirely appropriate, and even 
necessary, we do not sit as a super legislature.”  Id. 
 
Especially in light of our task of predicting how the 
Pennsylvania Supreme Court would resolve this question of 
state law, its prior decision in Hoy does at least provide a 
useful framework for considering the language, nature, and 
purpose of the PUFTA.  We nevertheless believe that this 
uniform fraudulent transfer statute differs in a number of 
important—and ultimately dispositive—ways from the anti-
discrimination statute addressed by the state supreme court in 
Hoy. 
 
 As the District Court admitted, “[p]unitive damages 
are not explicitly authorized by PUFTA.”  Klein III, 2010 WL 
2671450, at *4.  In other words, the PUFTA—like the 
PHRA—does not include a specific provision stating, for 
example, that a creditor “may obtain . . . punitive damages.”  
However, its “Remedies of creditors” section does contain a 
critical “catch-all” provision—Section 5107(a)(3)(iii) 
expressly provides that a creditor may obtain “any other relief 
the circumstances may require.”  Based simply on the 
language of this catch-all provision, a court evidently could 
award punitive damages as a form of “any other relief” that a 
creditor “may obtain” where “the circumstances may 
require.” 
 
According to Appellants, both statutes appear to 
contain a catch-all phrase that may provide for unlimited 
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remedies.  However, the so-called catch-all provision at issue 
in Hoy, i.e., “any other legal or equitable relief as the court 
deems appropriate,” actually constitutes a “subset” of another 
statutory term or category, i.e., “affirmative action.”  The 
PHRA itself is clear on this point, stating that “the court shall 
. . . order affirmative action which may include, but is not 
limited to, reinstatement or hiring of employes, granting of 
back pay, or any other legal or equitable relief as the court 
deems appropriate.”  43 Pa. Stat. Ann. § 962(c)(3) (emphasis 
added). 
 
In contrast, the basic language and structure of Section 
5107(a)(3)(iii), Section 5107 in general, and the PUFTA as a 
whole differ in several significant ways from the language 
and structure of the PHRA’s own remedial scheme.   Initially, 
the critical catch-all provision at issue here—“any other relief 
the circumstances may require”—is not a “subset” of an 
express statutory category, at least not in the same way in 
which “any other legal or equitable relief as the court deems 
appropriate” constitutes a subset of “affirmative action.”  
Instead of simply authorizing the trial court to order “legal or 
equitable relief” as a form of “affirmative action,” the 
PUFTA provides the court with broad authority to fashion the 
remedy—or package of remedies—based on the specific 
circumstances of each individual case.  We further note that 
this catch-all provision is not even phrased in terms of “legal” 
(e.g., compensatory damages) or “equitable” (e.g., an 
injunction) forms relief.  We acknowledge that, under Section 
5107(a)(3), a creditor may obtain “any other relief the 
circumstances may require” subject to the “applicable 
principles of equity” and in accordance with the “applicable 
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rules of civil procedure.”  Section 5107 likewise provides for 
various forms of equitable relief, including an injunction 
against further disposition of the asset under Section 
5107(a)(3)(i) and the appointment of a receiver to take charge 
of the asset pursuant to Section 5107(a)(3)(ii).  However, the 
statutory requirement that any relief be subject to, and in 
accordance with, “applicable” principles of equity and rules 
of civil procedure could simply mean that any relief granted 
must comply with the rules and procedures implicated by the 
specific kind of relief at issue.  For example, a creditor 
seeking an injunction would be required to meet the otherwise 
generally applicable requirements for this form of equitable 
relief (e.g., not have “unclean hands”), and a creditor seeking 
punitive damages likewise must satisfy the prerequisites for 
such an award (e.g., demonstrate that the defendant engaged 
in outrageous conduct).   At the very least, this “applicable 
principles” language cannot really be compared to the 
“affirmative action” language at issue in Hoy, and it thereby 
does not reduce the PUFTA’s otherwise expansive and open-
ended catch-all provision into nothing more than a mere 
subset of a larger term or category.  Although the 
Pennsylvania Supreme Court does not appear to have 
addressed the issue, we believe that it would hold that 
punitive damages are generally available in equitable actions.  
See, e.g., Nebesho v. Brown, 846 A.2d 721, 728 (Pa. Super. 
Ct. 2004) (indicating that attorney’s fees “in the nature of 
punitive damages” would be proper in equitable action to 
nullify deed).  Appellants, for their part, do not contest the 
general availability of punitive damages in equitable actions 
under Pennsylvania law.  Furthermore, the PUFTA expressly 
allows for an award of compensatory damages, at least under 
 27 
certain circumstances (i.e., pursuant to Section 5108(b), “the 
creditor may recover judgment for the value of the asset 
transferred, as adjusted under subsection (c), or the amount 
necessary to satisfy the creditor’s claim, whichever is less”).4 
 
  In contrast with the statutory scheme at issue in Hoy, 
the PUFTA also includes an express “Supplementary 
provisions” section.  Specifically, Section 5110 states in 
relevant part that, “[u]nless displaced by the provisions of this 
chapter, the principles of law and equity, including . . . the 
law relating to . . . fraud, [and] misrepresentation, . . . 
supplement its provisions.”  The commentary to Section 5107 
likewise indicates that this section’s remedies “are 
cumulative” in nature, 12 Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann. § 5107 cmt. 6 
(citations omitted), and “are not exclusive,” 12 Pa. Cons. Stat. 
Ann. § 5107 cmt. 1.  We have already noted that punitive 
damages are likely available in equitable actions under 
Pennsylvania law.  It is also uncontested that, at least in the 
context of common law fraud, defendants may be ordered to 
pay punitive damages.  In fact, “[i]t is difficult to picture a 
fact pattern which would support a finding of intentional 
fraud without providing proof of ‘outrageous conduct’ to 
support an award of punitive damages.”   Delahanty v. First 
Pa. Bank, 464 A.2d 1243, 1263 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1983).  As Ms. 
Klein and the District Court also point out, punitive damages 
have been awarded in the domestic relations context.  See, 
                                                 
4
 We also note that, while Sections 5107 and 5108 
clearly limit the monetary damages that a creditor may 
recover from a transferee, they less clearly limit the damages 
recoverable from the debtor.   
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e.g., Hess v. Hess, 580 A.2d 357, 358-59 (Pa. Super. Ct. 
1990) (upholding jury’s punitive damages award in favor of 
ex-wife on tort claim of fraud arising out of ex-husband’s 
fraudulent execution of property settlement agreement).  
Accordingly, it appears that, based on the language of Section 
5110, these well-established “principles of law and equity” 
governing the availability of punitive damages under 
Pennsylvania law “supplement” the PUFTA (or, in the words 
of the District Court, are “implicitly incorporated” into this 
statutory scheme, Klein III, 2010 WL 2671450, at *4 (citing § 
5110)). 
 
More broadly, we also believe that the underlying 
nature and purposes of the two statutory schemes 
substantially differ.  The Hoy court specifically addressed an 
anti-discrimination statute meant to improve, in the words of 
its title, “human relations” and remedy past harms.  Hoy, 720 
A.2d at 749.  In short, the PHRA was designed to foster and 
protect the employment of all individuals without regard to 
race, sex, or other invidious considerations and, in order to 
achieve such remedial goals, attempts to make the victims of 
discrimination whole.  Id.  After all, the notion of “affirmative 
action” appears to contemplate a range of make-whole 
remedies, and the PHRA itself provides some examples of 
such remedies, such as reinstatement.  Id. (“Likewise, the 
examples of appropriate remedies offered by the statute are 
make-whole measures, i.e., reinstatement, hiring, and back 
pay.  We believe that in the context of this statute, 
‘affirmative action’ is that action which serves to achieve the 
remedial goals of the Act.”).  The PUFTA does place 
particular emphasis on the “preservation of assets and making 
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the creditor whole” (Appellants’ Brief at 8), but it also 
includes an expansive and open-ended catch-all provision as 
well as a “Supplemental provisions” section.  Unlike anti-
discrimination legislation (which created a much-needed 
statutory remedy for the victims of discrimination and does 
not have a clear common law analogue), this uniform 
fraudulent transfer statute arises out of a long history of 
fraudulent conveyance law dating back to Queen Elizabeth I.  
As we have already noted, punitive damages are often 
awarded in  cases of common law fraud, and, in turn, this 
kind of relief is likely available in the equity (and domestic 
relations) context under Pennsylvania law. 
 
The facts of this case provide further support for this 
approach and, more broadly, for why punitive damages exist 
in the first place.  The District Court ordered Mr. Weidner to 
pay punitive damages in the amount of $548,797.07 on 
account of his outrageous conduct in connection with two 
fraudulent transfers.  This behavior included his intent to 
evade support obligations to his former wife and children 
even after those obligations were reduced to a judgment, and 
his various attempts to insulate and structure his assets and 
finances in order to evade his obligations and avoid paying 
any debt to Ms. Klein.  He even forged Ms. Weidner’s 
signature on a January 2010 mortgage of the Property 
intended to reduce even further the value of this asset.  Mr. 
Weidner also repeatedly harassed Ms. Klein herself (e.g., he 
filed a frivolous lawsuit against Ms. Klein alleging that she 
had stolen a horse and sent several e-mails to their children 
denigrating her attempts to collect the debt and threatening to 
withdraw his financial support) and made deeply disturbing 
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threats against her attorneys in this case (e.g., he sent a fax to 
one of her attorneys stating, inter alia, that “‘I will spend the 
time to find everything I can about you,’” including where the 
attorney lived, the car he drove, and “‘what kind of coffee 
you drink,’” Klein III, 2010 WL 2671450, at *4 n.8)).  
Simply put, “the facts of this case are extreme in that the 
defendant willfully defied a court order and used unlawful 
and threatening means to impede the judicial process.”  Id. at 
*10.  Emphasizing the open-ended nature of the penalty set 
forth in the PUFTA, the District Court added that “[n]ot every 
PUFTA case will contain such conduct beyond a single 
fraudulent transfer.”  Id.  Mr. Weidner has presented the 
District Court—and us—with an example of the very kind of 
outrageous and intolerable behavior that punitive damages are 
designed to punish and deter.  See, e.g., Hoy, 720 A.2d at 
749, 751 (recognizing that punitive damages promote 
deterrence and that such damages may deter future 
discrimination); Delahanty, 464 A.2d at 1263 (highlighting 
difficulty of picturing fact pattern that would support finding 
of intentional fraud but not finding of outrageous conduct).  
Simply put, where “a plaintiff can show outrageous conduct 
coupled with a fraudulent transfer,” Klein III, 2010 WL 
2671450, at *5, a court may award punitive damages as a 
form of “any other relief the circumstances may require.” 
 
In turn, we do not believe that Pennsylvania’s general 
preference for statutory remedies has any real effect in the 
present context.  Although the Hoy court did not expressly 
mention Section 1504 of the Pennsylvania Statutory 
Construction Act, Appellants do cite to case law relying on 
this specific rule of statutory construction to conclude that 
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punitive damages are not available under either the 
Pennsylvania Whistleblower Law, Rankin v. City of 
Philadelphia, 963 F. Supp. 463, 477-80 (E.D. Pa. 1997), or a 
section of the Pennsylvania Welfare Code requiring attorneys 
to notify the Pennsylvania Department of Public Welfare of 
tort damages recovered in medical malpractice suits, Dep’t of 
Pub. Welf. v. Portnoy, 566 A.2d 336, 339-41 (Pa. Commw. 
Ct. 1989), aff’d, 612 A.2d 1349 (Pa. 1992) (per curiam).  
However, the District Court properly distinguished both cases 
because the whistleblower statute and the welfare code set 
forth detailed and specific remedial schemes and, in turn, do 
not include either a catch-all provision like Section 
5107(a)(3)(iii) or a “Supplementary provisions” section 
resembling Section 5110.
5
  See Rankin, 963 F. Supp. at 477-
80; Portnoy, 566 A.2d at 339-41.   
                                                 
5
 At oral argument, Appellants cited to two other 
Pennsylvania Supreme Court decisions for support.  In Wertz 
v. Chapman Township, 741 A.2d 1272 (Pa. 1999), the court, 
conducting an analysis similar to the one it undertook in Hoy, 
concluded that a plaintiff is not entitled to a jury trial under 
the PHRA, id. at 1274-75.  Relying on Wertz, the state 
supreme court then determined in Mishoe v. Erie Insurance 
Co., 824 A.2d 1153 (Pa. 2003), that there is no right to a jury 
trial in a bad faith action against an insurer under a section of 
the Pennsylvania Judicial Code, id. at 1155-59.  Neither case 
has any real relevance to our current inquiry.  We have 
already addressed Hoy and Pennsylvania’s anti-
discrimination statute, and the Mishoe court actually rejected 
the contention that the provision “affords the right to a jury 
trial because it permits an award of punitive damages, which 
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Prior fraudulent transfer case law, applying both 
Pennsylvania and (especially) non-Pennsylvania law, also 
weigh in favor of our position regarding the availability of 
punitive damages.  The District Court, after its discussion of 
Section 1504, Rankin, and Portnoy, went on to observe that 
“courts sitting within this district have concluded punitive 
damages are available under PUFTA and the statute which 
preceded it.”  Klein III, 2010 WL 2671450, at *5 (citing State 
Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Tz’Doko V’Chesed of 
Klausenberg, 543 F. Supp. 2d 424, 431-32 (E.D. Pa. 2008); 
UGI Corp. v. Piccione, No. 88-1125, 1997 WL 698011, at *8-
*9 (E.D. Pa. Nov. 5, 1997); Shervin v. Liebersohn¸ 200 B.R. 
109, 112 (E.D. Pa. 1996)).  While these opinions were 
conclusory at best, Appellants themselves do not cite to any 
case specifically holding that punitive damages are 
unavailable under either the PUFTA or the PUFCA.  In any 
event, we follow Appellants’ own example and look to the 
law in other jurisdictions that have also adopted these 
respective uniform schemes.  See Moody, 971 F.2d at 1063. 
 
 In DFS Secured Healthcare Receivables Trust v. 
Caregivers Great Lakes, Inc., 384 F.3d 338 (7th Cir. 2004), 
the Seventh Circuit certified three questions regarding the 
Indiana Uniform Fraudulent Transfer Act (“IUFTA”) to the 
Indiana Supreme Court, including “the question whether 
punitive damages are available under the IUFTA,” id. at 355.  
It certified this specific question because of the absence of 
Indiana case law as well as the existence of disagreement in 
other states on this particular point: 
                                                                                                             
is traditionally within the domain of the jury,” id. at 1158.   
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No Indiana court, however, has addressed the 
question whether punitive damages can be 
awarded under the IUFTA, and other states are 
split on the question.  Compare Macris & 
Assocs., Inc. v. Neways, Inc., 60 P.3d 1176, 
1181 (Utah Ct.App. 2002) (allowing punitive 
damages under Utah’s UFTA); Volk Constr. 
Co. v. Wilmescherr Drusch Roofing Co., 58 
S.W.3d 897, 900 (Mo.Ct.App. 2001) (same 
under Missouri’s UFTA); Henderson v. 
Henderson, No. CV-00-53, 2001 WL 1719192, 
at *2 (Me.Super. 2001) (same under Maine’s 
Uniform Fraudulent Conveyance Act); 
Locafrance United States Corp. v. Interstate 
Distribution Servs., Inc., [451 N.E.2d 1222, 
1225 (Ohio 1983)] (same under Ohio’s Uniform 
Fraudulent Conveyance Act), with [Morris v. 
Askeland Enters., Inc., 17 P.3d 830, 833 
(Col.Ct.App. 2000)] (finding punitive damages 
are not available under Colorado’s UFTA), and 
Northern Tankers Ltd. v. Backstrom, 968 F. 
Supp. 66, 67 (D.Conn.1997) (same under 
Connecticut’s UFTA). 
 
Id. at 354-55.  Appellants exhibit admirable candor by 
acknowledging that “Ohio and Missouri have held that 
punitive damages may be available for violations of their 
respective UFTAs,” while adding that these decisions were 
based on “pre-existing bodies of law and unique 
interpretations of their UFTAs.”  (Appellants’ Brief at 12 n.3 
(citing Volk, 58 S.W.3d at 900; Aristocrat Lakewood Nursing 
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Home v. Mayne, 729 N.E.2d 768, 774-75 (Ohio Ct. App. 
1999)).)  They also claim that Texas and New York have 
concluded that punitive damages may not be recovered.  
However, the federal decisions cited by Appellants on this 
point did not actually address the specific question of whether 
punitive damages are available and instead indicated that 
fraudulent transfer laws generally have a remedial (as 
opposed to a punitive) purpose.  See ASARCO LLC v. 
Americas Mining Corp., 404 B.R. 150, 161 (S.D. Tex. 2009); 
In re Best Prods. Co., 168 B.R. 35, 57 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 
1994), appeal dismissed, 177 B.R. 791 (S.D.N.Y. 1995), 
aff’d, 68 F.3d 26 (2d Cir. 1995). 
 
In the end, we believe that the Pennsylvania Supreme 
Court would reach the same result as the courts of Maine, 
Missouri, Ohio, and Utah. 
 
Both the Seventh Circuit as well as the Missouri Court 
of Appeals have emphasized the expansive and open-ended 
nature of the statutory language at issue, especially the catch-
all provision.  Although it did not resolve the question (and 
the case was settled before the Indiana Supreme Court could 
decide the certified question, see Rose v. Mercantile Nat’l 
Bank of Hammond, 844 N.E.2d 1035, 1051 n.14 (Ind. Ct. 
App. 2008), aff’d in part and vacated in part on other 
grounds, 868 N.E.2d 772 (Ind. 2007)), the Seventh Circuit 
observed that the defendant—just like their counterparts in 
the current proceeding—argued that state law construes 
statutory remedies narrowly and only allows for punitive 
damages when the state legislature expressly includes them in 
the statute itself.  DFS, 384 F.3d at 355.  The Seventh Circuit 
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pointed out that “in none of the cases . . . did the statute in 
question contain anything like the catchall provision which is 
present in the IUFTA.”  Id. (citations omitted).  On the 
contrary, “a straightforward reading of the IUFTA’s catchall 
provision would seemingly allow for punitive damages.”  Id. 
at 354 (citing Ind. Code § 32-18-2-17(c)).  As the Missouri 
Court of Appeal noted in Volk, “[t]his language does not 
evidence an intent to prohibit punitive damage awards,” and it 
instead “expressly grants courts the authority to employ the 
full array of remedial measures insofar as they are warranted 
under the particular facts of the case.”  Volk, 58 S.W.3d at 
900. 
 
The DFS, Volk, and Locafrance courts likewise turned 
to pre-existing principles of law and equity.  In certifying the 
question to the Indiana Supreme Court, the Seventh Circuit 
noted that the IUFTA “incorporates principles of state 
common law” and that, under Indiana law, tortious conduct 
involving malice, fraud, gross negligence, or oppressiveness 
may be punished by an award of punitive damages.  DFS, 384 
F.3d at 354 (citing Ind. Code § 32-18-2-20).  Citing to 
Missouri’s equivalent of Section 5110, the Missouri Court of 
Appeals similarly observed that the “[t]he UFTA therefore 
specifically incorporates pre-existing legal and equitable 
principles related to the law of fraudulent conveyances 
insofar as those principles do not conflict with the provisions 
of the UFTA.”  Volk, 58 S.W.3d at 900 (footnote omitted).  
Missouri law provides that punitive damages are available 
where a debtor intentionally effectuates a fraudulent transfer 
in order to shield his or her assets.  Id.  Applying the state’s 
UFCA, the Ohio Supreme Court held that “common-law 
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remedies, including the law of fraud, may be applied when 
appropriate in fraudulent conveyance cases pursuant to R.C. 
1336.11” because “the action herein is not specifically 
provided for in either of the remedy sections” and “R.C. 
1336.11 allows that the rules of law and equity may govern.”  
Locofrance, 451 N.E.2d at 1225.  Previous Ohio case law, in 
turn, “has established that punitive damages and attorney’s 
fees are permissible in cases of fraud involving malicious and 
intentional conduct.”  Id.  In fact, the Colorado Court of 
Appeals in Morris and the Connecticut district court in 
Northern Tankers likewise relied on pre-existing legal and 
equitable principles to conclude that punitive damages are not 
available.  See Northern Tankers, 968 F. Supp. at 67; Morris, 
17 P.3d at 832.  It is well established that, under Pennsylvania 
law, punitive damages may be awarded in cases of common 
law fraud, and we also predict that the Pennsylvania Supreme 
Court would hold that punitive damages are generally 
available in equitable actions.  Pennsylvania’s general 
principles of law and equity therefore more closely resemble 
the pre-existing state law principles discussed in Volk and 
Locafrance than in either Morris or Northern Tankers.  See 
Volk, 58 S.W.3d at 900 n.3 (“Likewise, the Connecticut 
courts, while holding that punitive damages are not available 
under that state’s UFTA, also relied upon pre-existing state 
law to inform their interpretation of the remedies available 
under the UFTA.”). 
 
 In conclusion, we predict that, based on the language, 
nature, and purposes of the PUFTA as well as past case law, 
the Pennsylvania Supreme Court would conclude that 
punitive damages are available under the PUFTA. 
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IV. 
 
 For the foregoing reasons, we will affirm the orders 
entered by the District Court. 
